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MISCELLANEOUS
E. WI L MCCRACKIN*
Various subjects are again discussed under this title.
Even though the cases are interesting, none are novel. The
law, however, was well restated in some of them.
Trespass
In Hinson v. A. T. Sistare Construction Company, Inc.,1 the
plaintiff sought damages for willful trespass to property.
The defendant had gone upon the plaintiff's property in his
absence after being advised by the State Highway Depart-
ment that its bid for highway construction would be ac-
cepted by the Highway Department, but before the con-
tract was actually awarded. Also, the amount of the award
for the property condemned was not made to the plaintiff
until after the construction began. The trial court submitted
the question of actual and punitive damages to the jury. When
the verdict was returned, the jury had written: "We find for
the plaintiff the sum of nominal damages, actual damages
and $2,000.00 punitive damages." The court then instructed
the jury as to the meaning of "nominal damages" and sent
the jury back for it to decide the amount of nominal damages.
When the jury returned, it had substituted $200.00 in lieu
of the word "nominal," and left the punitive damages as
originally stated.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the finding of
$200.00 nominal damages was not responsive to the trial
judge's instructions and reversed the lower court as to actual
damages. It stated, "Where there has been a willful in-
vasion of a legal right but no substantial damage has been
shown to have resulted therefrom, the verdict for punitive
damages alone will stand, since it will be presumed that
nominal damages, incapable of admeasurement, have been
merged in the punitive damages."
Judgments
Singleton, et al v. Mullins Lumber Company, et al,2 was
an action by the heirs of a deceased mortgagor to set aside
*Attorney at Law, Myrtle Beach, S. C.
1. 236 S. C. 125, 113 S. E. 2nd 841 (1960).
2. 234 S. C. 330, 108 S. E. 2nd 414 (1959).
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a decree of foreclosure which had been rendered in 1909. It
was alleged in the complaint that the foreclosure was null and
void because in it there had been (1) no legal service of
process upon the defendants, (2) no order appointing a guard-
ian ad litem for minor defendants, (3) no order of reference
as required by circuit court rule 51, (4) no appearance by
the guardian ad litem, (5) no report by the Master of his
finding of fact and conclusions of law "as required by law"
and (7) no filing by the plaintiff of his affidavit or a cer-
tificate of the Clerk of Court that a notice of ls pendens had
been filed as required by said rule. The plaintiffs relied upon
lack of jurisdiction and fraud in order to maintain this action
in attacking the prior judgment. A quote from the Court
is apropos:
"Due proof of service appears in the record of the
foreclosure proceedings. Such a record, standing as it
has for approximately half a century, may not be over-
thrown by less than the clearest and most convincing evi-
dence. To hold otherwise would be a dangerous thing,
imperiling titles to real estate and other rights long
since adjudicated; it would, moreover, be contrary to
precedent unbroken in the history of our jurisprudence.
Even though proof of service were wholly lacking, it
would be presumed that the court that rendered the
judgment would not have done so without proper proof
of service of the summons in the cause. (cases cited)
And such presumption grows stronger with the passage
of time. (case cited)"
The Court then discussed at length what is meant by the
term "direct" and the term "collateral" as used with reference
to an attack upon a judgment. One should read this case
thoroughly for it is enlightening on this subject.
Unemployment Compensation
Our Court in Hyman v. S. C. Employment Security Com-
mission,3 in construing Section 68-113,4 held that "The
failure of a claimant for unemployment compensation bene-
fits to make a reasonable search for suitable work, inde-
pendently of the employment office wherein his claim is filed,
3. 234 S. C. 369, 108 S. E. 2nd 554 (1959).
4. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952. All code sections referred
to are in this Code.
[Vol. 13
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1960], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss1/10
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
is evidence of the plaintiff's detachment from the labor mar-
ket and consequent unavailability for work."
The lower court had reversed the finding of the commis-
sion that the plaintiff was ineligible for benefits because it
did not meet the availability requirements of the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Law. The Commission had based its
findings on the testimony of the claimant that he had only
been to the union and to the unemployment office seeking
employment. He also had stated that he had not looked for
non-union employment.
"We conclude that availability for work implies an un-
restricted exposure of the applicant for benefits to the
normal labor market to which he has been customarily
attached. The burden is upon the claimant for benefits
to show that he has met the benefit eligibility conditions
and that he is available for work. It is the duty of the
claimant for unemployment benefits to show that he has
made a reasonable effort to obtain employment in his
usual trade or occupation or other suitable employment.
Claimant does not make this showing simply by proving
that he has registered with the employment office of the
Commission and reporting to his union headquarters.
The failure of the claimant to make his personal search
for work during the period of his unemployment is ample
evidence to support the finding of fact by the Commis-
sion that he was unavailable for work within the mean-
ing of the S. C. Unemployment Compensation Law."
Mechanics' Liens
In Woody v. Hardy,5 the owner of a lot contracted with
Duckworth to construct a dwelling on the lot, the contract
being entered into on March 24, 1956. The owner was to
obtain a Veterans Administration loan with which to pay
the contractor, Duckworth. The contractor did not build
according to the agreed specifications and the Veterans Ad-
ministration refused to approve at the first inspection.
Later, Duckworth abandoned the contract and refused to
complete it. Thereafter, the Veterans Administration loan
was cancelled.
The plaintiff had furnished materials to Duckworth for
use in the dwelling. It developed that the plaintiff and the
5. 235 S. C. 131, 110 S. E. 2nd 157 (1959).
1960]
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defendant owner then contracted to complete the dwelling,
the plaintiff furnishing the necessary materials to the owner.
The defendant moved into the house on September 8, 1956,
at which time the plaintiff thought the house was completed.
However, the defendant complained about certain items, so
that plaintiff sent a plumber to the dwelling on October 8,
1956, to put in two joints of pipe which cost $4.12. No
additional charge was made by the plaintiff for the installa-
tion of these two joints of pipe.
Plaintiff filed his mechanic's lien on December 18, 1956,
in the office of the Clerk of Court for Oconee County and
on the same date served the same on the defendant. The
filing and serving of the mechanic's lien was within ninety
days from the furnishing of the last item on October 8, 1956,
but was not within ninety days from the furnishing of any
other material. This action to foreclose a mechanic's lien
was then commenced on January 21, 1957. The total amount
of the mechanic's lien as filed was $5,101.38, and the trial
court allowed the claim in the amount of $5,077.77. This
included the amount of the value of the materials furnished to
Duckworth prior to his abandoning the contract with the
defendant.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the mechanic's
lien was filed and served within the time- allowed by Section
45-259, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a mechanic's
lien for the amount of the labor and materials furnished
pursuant to his agreement with the defendant after Duck-
worth abandoned his contract. The Court reversed the lower
court's holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a mechanic's
lien for the amount of the materials furnished to Duckworth
prior to his abandoning the contract. The case was sent back
to the lower court for it to determine the amount that was
due to Duckworth by the defendant at the time respondent
gave appellant notice of the lien.
The Court quoted several paragraphs from Lowndes Hill
Realty Co. v. Greenville Concrete Co.6 which was applicable
to the case. The Court pointed out that the plaintiff supplier
could not obtain a mechanic's lien for more than the amount
due Duckworth by the defendant at the time Duckworth
abandoned the contract. Of course, this is in accord with
Section 45-254.
6. 229 S. C. 619, 93 S. E. 2nd 855 (1956).
[Vol. 13
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The Lowndes Hill Realty Co. case and the instant case
should be studied and thoroughly understood by lawyers rep-
resenting clients similar to the parties in these cases.
Architect's Certificate
A dispute between a building contractor and the members
of a sehool board was involved in Hines v. Farr, et a. Plain-
tiff had contracted to construct a building for the school
board, and the contract provided that when the contractor
was ready for the final inspection and acceptance, the archi-
tect would make such inspection, and when he found the
work acceptable under the contract, and the contract fully
performed, he would promptly issue a final certificate, over
his own signature, stating that the work provided for in the
contract had been completed and was acceptable to him under
the terms and conditions thereof, and that the entire balance
found to be due the contractor, and noted in said final certifi-
cate, was due and payable.
It further provided that, in the event of a dispute between
the parties, "it shall be the responsibility of the architect
to make written decisions in regard to all claims of the owner
or contractor and to interpret the contract document on all
questions arising in connection with the execution of the
work."
A dispute arose as to the amount due for extra compen-
sation by reason of rock excavation at the rate of $12.00
per cubic yard. The certificate filed by the architect showed
conclusively that the number of cubic yards of rock stated
in the claim was removed.
The case was tried before a jury, but upon proper motion,
the trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the
amount of his claim. The appellants contended that plaintiff
was barred from any recovery due to the fact that he failed
to demand arbitration within the period provided for in
the contract-thirty days after the dispute arose. The Court
held this to be no defense due to the fact that the same
parties were before the court in a different case in which
the court had ruled that the respondent was not entitled
to arbitration but must pursue his claim in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction. The prior case became res judicata.
7. 235 S. C. 436, 112 S. E. 2nd 33 (1960).
1960]
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On appeal, the trial court was affirmed in each instance
The Court held that the certificate of the architect-the agent
of the defendants-could not be impeached in the absence
of allegations and proof of fraud, dishonesty or incompetency
on the part of such architect. There was no such testimony
in the case or bar, and the court was bound by the architect's
certificate.
Boundaries
Smith v. Durant8 was an action for the possession of a lot
in the Town of Lake City. Plaintiff's father, T. A. Gaddy,
who owned land including that in controversy, died intestate
in 1935, leaving as his heirs at law plaintiff and her mother,
Mrs. Mammie B. Gaddy, who died intestate in 1953. The
mother had procured a subdivision of the property and a
plat of it by E. L. Isenhower, surveyor, dated September
20, 1938, which was duly recorded. Upon it there was shown
a triangular lot, 59A, at the intersection of the highway and
a street now called Moore Street. Adjoining it on the north-
east is lot 58A, with 58 feet frontage on the highway, then
lot 57A with 65 feet frontage, and adjoining the latter on
the northeast lot 56A with 100 feet frontage. The evidence
established that the plat was in error in that the lot in dis-
pute with 212.37 feet frontage lying between lots 57A and
56A had been overlooked and omitted by the surveyor.
In 1945, plaintiff's mother and the plaintiff then a minor,
by guardian ad litem, brought an action in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, naming defendant herein as a party, for the sale
and conveyance of respondent's undivided interest in lots
57A, 58A, and 59A. The Court ordered certain property sold,
namely, lot 59A and, "All those two certain pieces, parcels
or lots of land adjoining the above described lot, situate,
lying and being on U. S. Highway 52, and known and desig-
nated as the northern portion of lot 58A, less a road or
street passing through the southern portion thereof, deeded
to Town of Lake City, South Carolina, and lot 57A as shown
on the plat herein above referred to."
The above property was conveyed to the defendant in
that action, and a separate deed from the mother of the
plaintiff herein contained the same description, No bound-
aries of lot 57A are given although the erroneous plat showed
8. 268 S. C. 80, 113 S. E. 2nd 349 (1960). ,
[Vol. 13
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it as joining on the northeast lot 56A which, as a matter of
fact, it did not, inasmuch as the disputed area lay between
them. Lot 56A was and had been for some time the property
of one Burroughs.
This action was commenced by plaintiff within ten years
after she reached her majority so that adverse possession
was not a defense to her action.
The evidence showed without question that there was an
error of approximately 200 feet between Lot 56A as shown
on the Isenhower plat, and Lot 57A. The defendant herein
objected to the testimony of a surveyor, Floyd, who had found
the error in the plat. The Court allowed the testimony to be
admitted.
On appeal, several questions were passed upon by the Su-
preme Court. It affirmed the lower court in holding that the
testimony of Floyd was admissible on the ground that "Parol
testimony might be given in evidence, to explain the situation
of land, contrary to the face of the deed if it is evident from
the nature of the thing itself that there is a mistake in the
deed as where north is mentioned for north or south for
north, et vice versa .'"
The Court also held that the reasonable inference from the
evidence in the case was that the intention of the parties to
the contract of purchase of sale in 1945, and the judicial
proceedings to authorize the conveyance of plaintiff's interest,
was to sell to the purchaser, the defendant herein, the lots
designated by number in the proceedings and deeds, and not
to include the adjoining area which was omitted from the
plat through the error of the surveyor. A thread through all
the cases shows that it is the intention which governs and
when it is not expressed accurately in the deed, evidence
aliunde may be admitted to supply or explain it.
Another question presented by appellant, which the Court
decided was as follows:
"In the case of a conflict in the description in a deed
between the calls for distances and the cause for bound-
aries, which control?"
Appellant contended that the Isenhower plat shows his Lot
57A to be bounded on the north or northeast by Lot 56A
on the plat and that this should control because the convey-
ances to him refer to the plat, although the frontage of his
1960]
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lot 57A is stated on the plat to be 65 feet, whereas under his
contention the frontage would be approximately 300 feet.
The Court stated in regard to this,
"From the first case cited by him to the point and
referred to as the leading case on the subject, Fulwood
v. Graham, 1 Rich. 491, we quote the syllabus: 'In locat-
ing lands, the following rules are resorted to and gen-
erally in the order stated. (1.) Natural boundaries; (2.)
Artificial marks; (3.) Adjacent boundaries; (4.) Course
and distance. Neither rule, however, occupies an in-
flexible position, for when it is plain that there is a
mistake, an inferior means of location may control a
higher.'"
The Court went on to discuss several cases on point, but
overruled appellant's exception and held that the reference
to the plat and the size of the lot as shown on the plat was
controlling.
Commercial Transactions
In Charles R. Allen, Inc. v. Island Cooperative Services
Association Limited, et al.,9 our court held that in a situation
in which a draft was drawn on a purchaser and later dis-
counted at the defendant bank, the bank was the sole owner
of the draft and it could not be attached as property of the
payee, even though it had allowed the payee to immediately
use the proceeds therefrom. The bank collected interest on
the draft and was allowed to charge the draft back to the
payee's account in the event of non-payment. The facts in
this case are quite complicated but the evidence showed that
the proceeds of the draft when deposited with the defendant
bank were and could be withdrawn by the depositer freely.
The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court, then, appears
to be eminently correct.
This is an interesting case to read and covers many points
involved in commercial transactions in which banking insti-
tutions are involved.
9. 234 S. C. 537, 109 S. E. 2nd 446 (1959).
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